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Digital Rights in the Gulf Monitoring surveillance. Defending freedoms.

الحقوق الرقمية في الخليج مكافحة التجسس، والدفاع عن الحريات

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Google and Big Tech: From “Don’t be Evil” to “Ethically Flexible”
In February 2025, Google quietly removed a long standing pledge from its AI Principles: the commitment not to build artificial intelligence for weapons or surveillance from its publicly stated principles. What might look like a minor update to corporate policy is, in reality, a seismic shift in the politics of technology. When one of the world’s largest tech companies decides that it’s open to developing AI for warfare, the implications for human rights, accountability, and the future of digital freedom are enormous.

Ethically Flexible Approach to AI

Back in 2018, Google introduced its “AI Principles” where it committed not to design or deploy AI for use in “weapons or other technologies whose principal purpose or implementation is to cause or directly facilitate injury to people,” and “technologies that gather or use information for surveillance violating internationally accepted norms.” However, fast-forward to early 2025, and those explicit prohibitions are gone. Google removed the section titled “Applications we will not pursue” (including weapons) from its website. Instead, the updated policy says Google will work to align its AI with “widely accepted principles of international law and human rights” and support national security missions among governments that share certain values.

Why does this matter? Because when a company with Google’s impact decides that it is open to AI‐weapons (or AI for weapons decisions, or enabling military functions) the accessibility and “normality” of these weapons grows, this means: faster kill‐chains, less human oversight, and less clarity about responsibility and accountability. And when the threshold for deployment is “we believe the benefits substantially outweigh the risks,” you open a Pandora’s box of ethical implications.

The company’s new language focuses on “alignment with human rights” and “human oversight,” but offers no clear mechanism, no binding standards, and no guarantee that AI systems will be safe, transparent or auditable. As Human Rights Watch put it: voluntary guidelines are not a substitute for enforceable law.

Why This Matters for Digital Rights, Especially in the Gulf

This shift isn’t only about weapons. It’s about the deepening merger between Big Tech, state power, and systems of surveillance, which has severe implications for digital rights across the Gulf and beyond .

Around the world, AI systems built by private companies are already being used to analyse battlefield data, predict threats, and even select targets; where algorithmic decisions could determine who lives, who dies and who gets a say. But what’s new, and deeply concerning, is that global tech giants are now openly positioning themselves as partners in this militarised AI future.

Three Key Concerns

In the Gulf, the stakes are particularly high. The region has seen a great increase in expansion of state surveillance infrastructure, often framed as “smart governance” or “digital transformation.” When AI developed by companies like Google becomes embedded in these systems, it can dramatically amplify governments’ capacity to monitor, profile, and suppress dissent; especially in contexts where freedom of expression and privacy protections are already limited.
1. Erosion of Ethical Boundaries
  Once a company removes a clear “we won’t build this” clause, there’s no line left to defend. The principle and ethics surrounding AI becomes negotiable – a matter of interpretation, not conviction. The risk is not only what’s done, but the slippery slope: once the boundary moves, what stops further erosion?
2. Accountability Black Hole
  AI in warfare and surveillance operates in complex, opaque systems where errors or abuses are hard to trace. Who is responsible when an algorithm misidentifies a civilian as a target? The engineer? The military? The company? Without enforceable transparency and oversight, accountability disappears. In some cases, this might be by design. If the algorithm simply “misfired,” then the person that wanted to pull the trigger in the first place gets off free.
3. A Race to the Bottom
  Google justifies its change by invoking global competition; the need for “democracies” to lead in AI. But this logic risks triggering an arms race where ethical restraint is seen as weakness. If every company or country acts on that logic, no one wins and everyone loses.
Why we cannot rely only on self-regulation

Google’s decision to remove its pledge against AI for weapons is a flashing warning light. It tells us: the AI era’s ethical foundations are shifting. We must ask ourselves: when the company that once said “don’t be evil” says it is comfortable working on AI that might harm or surveil or kill, what does that say about the future we’re designing?

The use of this technology is far from “neutral” and how we choose to regulate it, govern it and deploy it will shape societies for decades. Let’s not allow the narrative to be set solely by corporate boardrooms or military budgets. The public stake is too high.

In February 2025, Google quietly removed a long standing pledge from its AI Principles: the commitment not to build artificial intelligence for weapons or surveillance from its publicly stated principles. What might look like a minor update to corporate policy is, in reality, a seismic shift in the politics of technology. When one of the world’s largest tech companies decides that it’s open to developing AI for warfare, the implications for human rights, accountability, and the future of digital freedom are enormous.

From “Don’t be Evil” to “Ethically Flexible”

Back in 2018, Google introduced its “AI Principles” where it committed not to design or deploy AI for use in “weapons or other technologies whose principal purpose or implementation is to cause or directly facilitate injury to people,” and “technologies that gather or use information for surveillance violating internationally accepted norms.” However, fast-forward to early 2025, and those explicit prohibitions are gone. Google removed the section titled “Applications we will not pursue” (including weapons) from its website. Instead, the updated policy says Google will work to align its AI with “widely accepted principles of international law and human rights” and support national security missions among governments that share certain values.

Why does this matter? Because when a company with Google’s impact decides that it is open to AI‐weapons (or AI for weapons decisions, or enabling military functions) the accessibility and “normality” of these weapons grows, this means: faster kill‐chains, less human oversight, and less clarity about responsibility and accountability. And when the threshold for deployment is “we believe the benefits substantially outweigh the risks,” you open a Pandora’s box of ethical implications.

The company’s new language focuses on “alignment with human rights” and “human oversight,” but offers no clear mechanism, no binding standards, and no guarantee that AI systems will be safe, transparent or auditable. As Human Rights Watch put it: voluntary guidelines are not a substitute for enforceable law.

Why This Matters for Digital Rights, Especially in the Gulf

This shift isn’t only about weapons. It’s about the deepening merger between Big Tech, state power, and systems of surveillance, which has severe implications for digital rights across the Gulf and beyond .

Around the world, AI systems built by private companies are already being used to analyse battlefield data, predict threats, and even select targets; where algorithmic decisions could determine who lives, who dies and who gets a say. But what’s new, and deeply concerning, is that global tech giants are now openly positioning themselves as partners in this militarised AI future.

In the Gulf, the stakes are particularly high. The region has seen a great increase in expansion of state surveillance infrastructure, often framed as “smart governance” or “digital transformation.” When AI developed by companies like Google becomes embedded in these systems, it can dramatically amplify governments’ capacity to monitor, profile, and suppress dissent; especially in contexts where freedom of expression and privacy protections are already limited.

Three Key Concerns
1. Erosion of Ethical Boundaries
  Once a company removes a clear “we won’t build this” clause, there’s no line left to defend. The principle and ethics surrounding AI becomes negotiable – a matter of interpretation, not conviction. The risk is not only what’s done, but the slippery slope: once the boundary moves, what stops further erosion?
2. Accountability Black Hole
  AI in warfare and surveillance operates in complex, opaque systems where errors or abuses are hard to trace. Who is responsible when an algorithm misidentifies a civilian as a target? The engineer? The military? The company? Without enforceable transparency and oversight, accountability disappears. In some cases, this might be by design. If the algorithm simply “misfired,” then the person that wanted to pull the trigger in the first place gets off free.
3. A Race to the Bottom
  Google justifies its change by invoking global competition; the need for “democracies” to lead in AI. But this logic risks triggering an arms race where ethical restraint is seen as weakness. If every company or country acts on that logic, no one wins and everyone loses.
Why we cannot rely only on self-regulation

Google’s decision to remove its pledge against AI for weapons is a flashing warning light. It tells us: the AI era’s ethical foundations are shifting. We must ask ourselves: when the company that once said “don’t be evil” says it is comfortable working on AI that might harm or surveil or kill, what does that say about the future we’re designing?

The use of this technology is far from “neutral” and how we choose to regulate it, govern it and deploy it will shape societies for decades. Let’s not allow the narrative to be set solely by corporate boardrooms or military budgets. The public stake is too high.
2026-01-25
Platform Compliance in the Middle East: How Opaque Content Moderation Enables Quiet Authoritarian Censorship

Across the MENA region, particularly in the Gulf, political speech increasingly disappears from major platforms not through court orders or explicit bans, but through opaque content moderation decisions taken unilaterally by social media platforms that operate regional hubs in the Middle East. Posts critical of authorities or state policies are removed or restricted under vague claims of policy violations, with no clear explanation or any possibility of meaningful appeal.

Although Gulf states have a long-established tradition of suppressing peaceful dissent through prosecution, these digital platform removals rarely involve public legal processes. Instead, they reflect a deeper shift in how power over speech is exercised: through a quiet alignment of platform governance with authoritarian state interests. This model of repression relies on indirect pressure, anticipatory compliance, and corporate incentives that prioritize business continuity over human rights protection.

Iraq illustrates how authoritarian-leaning governments can exploit platform compliance to suppress dissent and implement mechanisms of state-enabled digital censorship. IFEX has documented cases in which Iraqi authorities threatened to impose advertising bans on Meta if it did not comply with requests to remove a series of Facebook posts alleging judicial corruption. Platforms seeking to maintain operational stability or avoid retaliation respond by restricting content without transparent justification, becoming enforcers of state speech norms without being formally accountable as state actors.

The regulatory environments of Gulf and Middle East states play a critical role in shaping this behavior. As noted by the Middle East Institute, geopolitical power imbalances enable a system in which speech is constrained through corporate compliance. Platforms such as Meta and X, which maintain significant commercial interests in the region, are incentivized to adjust enforcement practices to avoid friction with authorities and protect market access.

In the case of Saudi Arabia, alignment between platform moderation and state interests often occurs without visible requests at all. Because political red lines are well established, content restriction by platforms operating in or around the Saudi market is frequently anticipatory, occurring before it triggers government attention. This dynamic mirrors what Human Rights Watch has described as “systemic” content suppression, where internal platform policies and enforcement practices disproportionately silence political speech in sensitive contexts. The result is a digital environment shaped by preemptive self-censorship, driven by business considerations rather than human rights concerns.

Given that the costs of over-removal are low and the risks of non-compliance are high, platforms face little to no consequences for restricting lawful speech. This is facilitated by reliance on opaque and broadly framed policies that do not require consistent disclosure of government takedown requests, informal communications, or internal risk assessments. Appeals mechanisms are typically automated and limited; all of which makes it difficult to distinguish between genuine policy enforcement and politically motivated suppressions.

Under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, companies have a responsibility to avoid contributing to human rights violations and to provide remedies when these occur. Yet opaque moderation systems and informal platform compliance fall short of these standards. Through indirect regulatory pressure, social media platforms have become key actors in constraining political expression.

ECDHR calls on platforms to disclose government takedown requests through transparency reports that provide clear information on procedures and safeguards applied. ECDHR also urges platforms with regional hubs to conduct independent human rights audits to ensure the respect of fundamental rights. Without such measures, corporate compliance will continue to prioritize revenue over human rights, embedding quiet censorship in the digital infrastructure of the Middle East.

2026-01-25
The Gulf’s Smart City Future is Built on Total Surveillance

Across the Gulf, governments are racing to reinvent themselves as hyper-efficient “smart cities”, supported by a growing reliance on digital services, automation, and AI-driven public administration. More recently, the Emirati government declared that it aims to become the world’s first “AI-native” government by 2027, embedding machine learning systems into nearly every layer of governance. But behind this marketing lies an alarming reality: smart-city infrastructure is being repurposed for policing, surveillance, and social control.

The UAE provides a clear example of what an AI state looks like in practice. Cameras, biometric systems, and predictive analytics form an ambient surveillance network that residents cannot opt out of. AI systems now support a wide range of public administration functions, including law enforcement, prosecution, and parts of the judicial process. For example, under the UAE’s Oyoon Project, thousands of CCTV cameras across Dubai feed live video to a central command centre where machine-learning algorithms perform continuous facial recognition. This practice has resulted in hundreds of arrests for activities labeled as “suspicious”, but the automated analysis and underlying criteria driving these determinations remain opaque. As noted by Human Rights Watch, the extensive mass surveillance employed through an unregulated AI-driven framework constitutes a serious threat to privacy and freedom of expression.

The risks are most acute for marginalized communities such as migrant workers, who make up the majority of the UAE population. Predictive policing systems raise the risk that workers may be automatically flagged based on algorithmic profiles. In fact, surveillance technologies are embedded in a social ordering that ties security to race, migration status, and labour, reinforcing structural inequality by rendering certain populations institutionally suspect. For these communities, smart-city infrastructure constitutes a new layer of vulnerability and prosecution.

Despite the rapid expansion of AI-enabled policing, the UAE has not implemented any laws regulating the use of AI in criminal proceedings, creating significant due process concerns. Currently, AI systems operate with no independent audit mechanisms and with no procedure to challenge algorithmic errors. Data retention and use remains opaque, lacking any transparency obligations. The result of this legal vacuum is a civic redesign of urban environments, where surveillance becomes normalized and fundamental rights quietly erode.

The UAE’s smart city policing offers a small-scale preview of the ambitious model taking shape in Saudi Arabia’s NEOM, a smart city megaproject that places dense sensor networks at the core of its infrastructure. A 2025 report reveals that NEOM’s command and control center synthesizes inputs from cameras, sensors and biometric gates to algorithmically map behavior and detect what it labels as anomalies. In light of this, human rights groups warn that NEOM represents a blueprint for full-spectrum monitoring, embedding surveillance into the city and normalizing unprecedented data centralization.

The UAE’s current practices and Saudi Arabia’s NEOM vision illustrate a regional pattern of smart-city design in which digital services and urban policing converge to form a new Gulf governance model. The shift is therefore not merely a technological one, but a political one as well. Smart-city projects provide states with powerful tools for high-tech authoritarian governance, turning efficiency into enforcement.

As the Gulf accelerates toward its smart-city future, an urgent question to consider is whether there are sufficient safeguards and protections over how these technologies reshape the rights and autonomy of populations. DR4G condemns the unregulated expansion of AI-driven surveillance across the Gulf, where smart city technologies are deployed with no transparency or oversight. Additionally, DR4G calls for an immediate rights-based governance of AI systems, which includes clear legal limits on surveillance, independent auditing, and protections for the communities most vulnerable to technological harm. Without enforceable safeguards, the Gulf’s smart cities may become a permanent infrastructure of repression.

2026-01-25
State Immunity in the Age of Spyware: Bahrain’s Case Before the UK Supreme Court

A decade-old spyware operation conducted by Bahrain is now at the centre of a landmark case before the UK Supreme Court. The outcome could determine whether governments may deploy spyware against political exiles abroad while relying on state immunity to evade accountability.

The claim, brought by two Bahraini dissidents who have lived in the UK since 2006, accuses Bahrain of infecting their computers over a decade ago with FinSpy, a surveillance software that allows operators to access files, monitor communications, and enable microphones and cameras for live surveillance. After discovering the intrusion, they described lasting psychological distress and are now seeking damages for personal injury.

This case unfolds against a broader pattern in which authoritarian governments across the Gulf have expanded their use of commercial spyware to target critics and human rights defenders. Such technology has been used to monitor online activity and construct cybercrime or terrorist-related charges against dissidents. Despite the gravity of these practices, accountability has remained elusive.

So far, lower courts in the UK have rejected Bahrain’s argument that it must be protected by state immunity because the alleged hacking did not occur within the UK. Because its operators would have acted abroad, their conduct should fall outside the jurisdiction of British courts. However, to accept this view means conceding that digital repression, precisely because it is borderless, will fall through the cracks of international law.

The Court of Appeal, in contradiction with Bahrain’s argument, held that even if the alleged hacking occurred abroad, the effects were felt within the UK, so much so that the country’s territorial sovereignty suffered interference. The compromised devices, the violation of claimant’s privacy, and the psychological injury took place on British soil. A view that recognizes that territorial boundaries collapse when abuses are carried out digitally.

The legal novelty of this case also stems from the fact that traditional doctrines of sovereign immunity, such as those codified in the UK’s 1978 State Immunity Act, were never crafted with advanced digital technologies in mind. The legal tension between accountability and sovereignty is exacerbated by the fact digital attacks, by their very nature, transcend any border. In this context, the courts must consider the central question of whether a state can inflict harm entirely digitally and then insist that, because the technical action occurred abroad, it cannot be held accountable.

The implications of this case extend far beyond compensating two individuals harmed by surveillance. If Bahrain’s immunity claim were upheld, states could exploit this reasoning to conduct surveillance remotely while avoiding any legal consequence. Conversely, rejecting the immunity claim would open a new avenue for dissidents to challenge digital operations, making civil claims more viable. It may also pressure governments and companies to adopt safeguards, increase transparency around spyware procurement, and affirm that individuals targeted by states have the right to seek justice wherever they reside.

The stakes of this case are high. Its outcome will send a message to governments across the Gulf, and the world at large, about the limits of transnational repression. As this case moves forward, the UK has the responsibility to draw a clear line: digital repression must not become a consequence-free tool of authoritarian states. DR4G urges UK authorities to affirm that those targeted by foreign governments have the right to seek justice, regardless of where the act originates from. Rejecting Bahrain’s immunity claim is an essential step to ensure that the UK remains a place where the unlawful reach of authoritarian states meets a firm limit.

2026-01-25
Saudi Arabia’s Persecution Beyond Borders: the Case of Human Rights Defender Al-Khalidi

Saudi human rights defender and online political activist Abdulrahman Al-Khalidi, detained in Bulgaria since 2021, faces a forced deportation order to Saudi Arabia, placing him at serious risk of torture, an unfair trial and the death penalty. Al Khalidi’s case reflects a wider campaign of transnational repression by Gulf regimes seeking to silence peaceful dissent and maintain control over narratives beyond their borders.

In October 2021, Al-Khalidi crossed the border between Turkey and Bulgaria on foot and sought asylum upon his arrival in Bulgaria. His decision to flee Turkey came after an intensified campaign against Saudi activists there, most notably the murder of his collaborator, Jamal Khashoggi. Instead of granting his asylum request, Bulgarian authorities arrested him two days later. During his interrogation, Al-Khalidi reported seeing a Saudi representative observing the proceedings alongside Bulgarian officials. This raises serious concerns about the transnational reach of Saudi repression and the diplomatic pressure exerted on other countries, such as Bulgaria, at the expense of the rights of asylum seekers and due process.

Since then, Al-Khalidi has been held in arbitrary detention despite an administrative court issuing a non-appealable decision in March 2025 which demands his release. Rather than complying with this ruling, the Bulgarian National Security Agency has issued “counterdecisions” to circumvent the release order and approve his forced deportation, calling Al-Khalidi a threat; seemingly aligning with Saudi Arabia’s so-called “national security” designation that labels Al-Khalidi as a threat to the Kingdom. Pending his deportation, authorities have transferred him to a deportation centre, where to this day he suffers from poor living conditions, physical abuse, and inadequate medical care.

This is not an isolated case, but a strategy that allows the Saudi government to extend its repressive control of dissidents who have fled the Kingdom over threats and safety concerns. According to a recent European Parliament study, one of the primary tactics of transnational repression is the co-option of other states, in which authoritarian regimes manipulate foreign authorities and institutions to act against targeted individuals. This includes the abuse of international mechanisms, such as the Interpol Red Notice system, to facilitate the detention and deportation of activists.

Across the Gulf, an array of national security measures and cybercrime laws are routinely weaponized to criminalize peaceful criticism of the government. Individuals targeted are then placed on international terrorist watchlists and subsequently detained without due process, as in the case of Al-Khalidi. Meanwhile, Interpol’s growing presence in the Middle East and its deepened cooperation with the Arab Interior Ministers’ Council has enabled extensive data sharing between the two, raising serious concerns about transparency and the risk of politically motivated arrests, especially given the widespread human rights violations in the Gulf related to freedom of expression. This highlights how international mechanisms intended for security are being turned into tools of repression by the Gulf and exploited to legitimize transnational campaigns that enable the cross-border persecution of online activists. In Al-Khalidi’s own words, “individual cases are no longer a reasonable explanation, but an institutional pattern requiring review”.

The detention and forced deportation of Al-Khalidi constitutes violations of international human rights law, including Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture, which enshrines the principle of non-refoulement, prohibiting the return of individuals to countries where they face a risk of torture and persecution. His case exemplifies how Saudi Arabia’s transnational repression operates through targeted strategies and the manipulation of international systems, threatening the safety of individual activists and undermining the asylum protections they seek abroad.

In light of these abuses, DR4G urges authorities to immediately halt Al-Khalidi’s deportation, comply with domestic court rulings, and uphold their obligations under international law. Furthermore, DR4G calls on Interpol to strengthen its safeguards against the political abuse of security frameworks and to ensure that activists seeking protection are not detained unjustly through international complicity.

2025-11-14
Biometric Surveillance and Personal Data Protection in the Gulf: A Growing Human Rights Concern

Over the past decade, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have been enacting Personal Data Protection Laws (PDPLs) in order to better regulate the collection and processing of their citizens’ personal information. Even though these laws can be considered as an important step forward in safeguarding privacy in increasingly digitalized societies, they also raise important questions about data protection, state control and human rights. As a matter of fact, the governments in the region have been expanding their use of biometric technologies (i.e. facial recognition, fingerprints scanning) – especially in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) thanks to large investments made in AI development – and this has raised concerns about how such measures could be leveraged for unauthorized surveillance or even political suppression. Such a concern is legitimate especially after analysing the different PDPLs of every one of these countries.

Among the GCC countries, Qatar was the first to issue a Personal Data Protection Law (PDPL) in 2016. However, the country still faces significant shortcomings in implementing this law, especially when it comes to protecting data subjects’ rights, clearly defining sensitive data (such as biometric and genetic data), and outlining the obligations of data processors and controllers toward the data subjects. In fact, the law provides a list of several cases in which the consent of the data subject is not necessary for the processing of personal data. One of these cases being data processing for reasons of “public interest” – a term that leaves space for broad interpretation.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), at first glance, seems to have established a more comprehensive system for data protection under the supervision of the Saudi Arabia for Data and Artificial Intelligence (SDAIA) and its PDPL of 2024 tries to resemble the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Despite explicitly recognizing biometric data and imposing strong penalties for violations, the PDPL’s exceptions – similarly to Qatar’s – includes reasons of “public interest or security purposes” in which the data subject’s consent is not a requisite. These provisions, in the hands of a government known for being highly suppressive against political dissent and criticism, effectively legitimize and institutionalize mass data collection under the pretext of “national security”.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) presents a complex framework when it comes to data protection laws. On one hand, in the PDPL of 2022 biometric data falls under the scope and definition of “Sensitive Personal Data” and it also contains a broad obligation to process personal data in a transparent manner, on the other hand the law remains largely unenforced – the Data Office responsible for its implementation has yet to be established and no penalties are specified in case of violations. Moreover, the coexistence of parallel data protection frameworks such as the Dubai Data Law No. 26 of 2015 and the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) Data Protection Law of 2020, fragments accountability and creates loopholes that can easily become a tool of power in the hands of the government. The UAE is known for extensive use of biometric surveillance technologies – like the KSA – in public places too. This lack of enforcement can only raise serious concerns about unchecked biometric monitoring and the erosion of privacy.

In analysing the other GCC countries, it emerges that Oman’s 2022 PDPL contains relatively progressive provisions, including recognition of biometric data as “sensitive personal data”, explicit consent requirement and restrictions of processing biometric information without the authorization of the ministry. Bahrain, with its Law No. 30 of 2018 (enacted in 2019), goes further in enforcement, with criminal penalties up to one year of imprisonment and large fines for unauthorized processing. It also specifies that the processing of biometric data, together with genetic data too, needs a written authorization by the competent Authority, otherwise is prohibited. Yet both laws – like those of their neighboring countries – include broad exemptions for “national security” and “public interest”. These vague terms provide legal cover for the very practices the laws claim to regulate. Moreover, it is interesting to notice how Bahrain, in listing the countries that are considered to have adequate protection of personal data for cross-border transfers, includes also Kuwait in which, as of today, there is no specific PDPL in force. This contradiction highlights how data protection in the Gulf often serves more as a legal façade than a genuine commitment to safeguarding individual privacy.

The uneven implementation and varying strength of GCC data protection frameworks highlight a broader tension between privacy rights and state control. While these laws appear to align with international standards like the GDPR, their exceptions and lack of particular consideration for biometric data often completely negate their protective potential. Without independent oversight bodies and enforceable transparency mechanisms, biometric surveillance risks becoming a political tool. For genuine progress, the region must move beyond formal legislation and ensure that data protection serves its intended purpose: the defense of individual rights and human dignity.

2025-11-04
How Digital Spaces Reinforce Gender Violence in Saudi Arabia

Since 2019, Saudi Arabia has lifted many of the restrictions imposed on women under the male guardianship system, with Crown Prince MBS praising these measures as evidence of the kingdom’s progress towards gender equality. Among other reforms, women over 21 were granted the right to obtain passports and travel without a male guardian’s permission. Yet in practice, the reality of women’s autonomy in Saudi Arabia remains far more complex than any legislative amendment might suggest. Women remain constrained by enduring social prejudice and discriminatory attitudes, manifesting increasingly behind a layer of digital control. Saudi Arabia’s online spaces continue to reproduce patriarchal hierarchies, enabling online harassment and restrictions that limit women’s freedoms in the virtual sphere.

The rise of an interconnected digital community on the internet has made Saudi women more visible and active in public discourse, something that was largely uncommon and impossible in the past. Yet women are heavily pressured and discouraged from engaging in online activism, their visibility often being perceived as a threat. The online presence of high-profile female activists has triggered significant levels of digital violence against women, including online verbal abuse, frequent unsolicited contact, and even stalking. According to recent studies, one in four women using internet platforms in Saudi Arabia has experienced at least one form of digital violence. This shows how, with formal guardianship laws now partially dismantled, discrimination has largely shifted into digital spaces, where it continues to reinforce offline social hierarchies.

One of the most common tactics employed against women activists is the use of so-called “electronic armies”, composed of networks of coordinated social media users who assume false identities and conduct online hate campaigns to intimidate peaceful dissidents. Many of these actors operate as unofficial agents of the Saudi government. These groups communicate through encrypted platforms such as Telegram and Whatsapp, where they receive lists of targets to harass, meeting daily quotas of abusive messages and tweets. The impact of these digital attacks extends beyond the digital sphere, often escalating into physical harm.

Saudi Arabia’s digital repression of women is not only domestic. It also targets exiled activists as part of a transnational network of repression that undermines digital rights and freedom of expression. According to a Freedom House report, women have been disproportionately targeted in the kingdom’s transnational campaigns in comparison to their male counterparts. In fact, since MBS’s rise to power, the government’s intensified gender-based repression coincided with a sharp increase in the number of Saudi women seeking asylum abroad. Yet, activists abroad remain subject to punitive measures, with Saudi authorities reportedly using spyware and online harassment to monitor and intimidate women.

In light of this ongoing persecution, the government’s promotion of Digital Saudi 2030, a central part of the Vision 2030 initiative, appears deeply contradictory and deceiving. There is a concerning discrepancy between Saudi Arabia’s rhetoric of digital modernization and its continued use of censorship, surveillance and repression against activists. For example, the enactment of the Personal Status Law in 2022 was framed as a major reform in the struggle against gender discrimination. While the government celebrates the law, experts argue that it codifies several discriminatory practices, including the requirement for women to obtain a guardian’s consent to marry. Women’s rights activists in Saudi Arabia, who had long advocated for a codified Personal Status Law, were excluded from the drafting process and silenced when they sought to comment publicly on it. Many faced arbitrary arrest, detention, and travel bans, demonstrating the kingdom’s intolerance toward women’s civic participation.

A 2024 World Bank report on Women, Business, and the Law suggests a lack of mechanisms to ensure the effective implementation of laws relating to women’s rights in Saudi Arabia. This stems from insufficient supportive frameworks and government-led services that ensure the protection of women’s rights in practice. The findings reveal a disconnect between women’s growing participation in the digital economy and their continued vulnerability online. To address this gap, Saudi Arabia must move beyond its legislative promises and implement practical measures to protect women in digital spaces.
Despite formal legal reforms, Saudi women continue to face higher risks of violence in digital spaces, highlighting how patriarchal norms remain deeply entrenched in society. Women who engage online are vulnerable to harassment and targeted repression by both state authorities and members of society. DR4G demands that the Saudi government implements comprehensive protections tailored to the specific forms of digital violence that women face. This must include safety measures and accessible resources to mitigate online harassment, as well as transparent investigations into violations by authorities. Only by aligning legislative reform with practical frameworks can women be protected from digital violations to make their voices heard in public discourse.

2025-11-04
From Egypt to the Gulf: How Regional Cybercrime Laws Are Criminalizing Peaceful Dissent

The arbitrary detention of Egyptian journalist Ismail Iskandarani over recent Facebook posts, just two days after President Sisi pardoned six imprisoned activists, exposes Egypt’s harsh political reality: occasional gestures of leniency masks ongoing repression. Iskandarani was accused of “spreading false news” and “inciting terrorist acts” even though under Human Rights law this is considered to constitute protected peaceful speech. This represents a broader pattern of intolerance towards independent journalism and online dissent, particularly it highlights the legal loopholes in Egypt’s cybercrime legislation, mirroring similar laws across the Gulf that continue to undermine freedom of expression and Speech.

Since taking office in 2014, President Sisi has transformed Egypt into one of the most repressive environments for journalism, with over 170 journalists imprisoned and over 500 news websites blocked in the past decade. This suppression of press freedom follows a wider regional trend across the Gulf, where governments continue to criminalize free speech. Saudi Arabia and the UAE rank 162nd and 164th out of 180, respectively, in the World Press Freedom Index. In Qatar, recent arrests of two online activists who peacefully criticized the government further underscore the region’s tightening grip on digital expression.

Throughout the MENA region, cybercrime legislation has emerged as a central instrument of digital repression, allowing authorities wide discretion to police online speech. Egypt’s Anti-Cybercrime Law provides authorities with a discretionary power to restrict access to any website deemed a threat to national security. As noted by AFTE, an Egyptian NGO, the term ‘national security’ is so broadly defined that it effectively covers anything related to the stability and security of the nation, the President’s affairs, and the work of its government-affiliated agencies. The law’s extensive scope permits the arbitrary prosecution of almost any political commentary, placing journalists covering government-related matters at constant risk of prosecution.

Egypt’s cybercrime framework exhibits key flaws that closely resemble those in the Gulf. In fact, according to a Chatham House report most GCC countries have adopted cybercrime laws whose content directly conflicts with international human rights law. Furthermore, the absence of procedural rules for cybercrime prosecutions means that electronic evidence is treated the same as physical evidence, creating a significant gap in the legal system and preventing the proper handling of digital data. These structural weaknesses grant authorities greater control over cybercrime investigations and enable the judiciary to interpret the laws in its favour, opening the door to potential violations of the right to a fair trial.

For instance, the UAE’s 2021 Combatting Rumours and Cybercrime Law further restricts the legality of peaceful criticism through its provisions. Article 22 criminalizes online sharing of any information or documents that “may harm the State’s interests”, without clearly defining what constitutes a threat to the State or specifying maximum sentences. This legal ambiguity creates the risk of disproportionate punishment, as in the case of human rights activist Ahmed Mansoor, sentenced to ten years of prison for his online activity.

Cybercrime legislation across the MENA and GCC region remains harsh and deeply problematic. Its vaguely defined provisions enable authorities to exercise broad discretion and impose arbitrary sentences, placing all peaceful dissenters at risk. Digital Rights 4 Gulf calls on governments across Egypt and the Gulf to stop weaponizing cybercrime laws against their own citizens. As the internet becomes the main platform for activism and public discourse, it is imperative that governments including Egypt and the GCC countries adopt clearer, more narrowly defined laws to ensure the protection of digital rights and freedom of expression.

2025-10-29
Remembering Jamal Khashoggi: Seven Years Later

Seven years after the shocking murder of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi citizen and outspoken critic of the Saudi government, DR4G continues to denounce the absence of justice in his case. We once again call for an independent and impartial investigation into the responsibility of senior Saudi officials, including Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman; not only for Khashoggi, but for all those targeted through digital surveillance and cross-border repression.

Khashoggi, a critic of Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), was murdered inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Despite international outrage and comprehensive UN and US investigations, the main perpetrators have faced seemingly no accountability.

The Man Behind the Story:

Before his name became synonymous with one of the most shocking political murders of our time, Jamal Khashoggi was a journalist committed to the ideals of a freer and more open Arab world. Since his death, friends and colleagues have recalled his warmth, humility, and unwavering belief in dialogue over division. Though he once advised members of the Saudi elite, he grew increasingly critical of the government’s suppression of dissent and concentration of power. In his final column, published posthumously, he argued that “what the Arab world needs most is free expression,” Though that conviction cost him his life, his words continue to inspire journalists, activists, and citizens who refuse to remain silent in the face of repression

Clear evidence of impunity:

In June 2019, UN Special Rapporteur Agnes Callamard released a detailed report concluding that Khashoggi’s murder was a “premeditated execution” for which Saudi Arabia was responsible. The report provided credible evidence linking MBS to the crime and called for an international investigation and sanctions against high-level officials. The report emphasized that the operation required substantial human and financial resources, indicating direct involvement and approval at the highest levels of the Saudi state. Callamard also criticized the Saudi trial of suspects, describing it as lacking transparency and not conducted in “good faith”. However, these recommendations continue to be ignored. The Saudi government dismissed the report as biased and unfounded, and to this day refuses to cooperate with international investigators or allow access to key evidence.

Additionally, an investigation by US national security agencies in 2021 also found that the crown prince had most likely approved the “capture or kill” operation. That assessment was based on the prince’s control in decision making, the direct involvement of a key adviser and members of Muhammad bin Salman’s protective detail in the operation, and the Crown Prince’s support for using violent measures to silence dissidents abroad, including Khashoggi. These findings concluded that it is highly unlikely that officials would have carried out such an operation without authorization.

The Saudi government denied these claims and has labeled them as “biased and unfounded”. To this day, they refuse to cooperate with international investigators or allow access to key evidence.

No clear path for Justice:

However, the international community has still not committed to taking on a meaningful role for justice. While some countries imposed sanctions on individuals involved in the murder, these measures stopped short of targeting MBS. The United States introduced a resolution called the “Khashoggi Ban,” restricting visas for 76 Saudi individuals believed to be involved in counter-dissident activities, but did not sanction the Crown Prince himself. Similarly, the UK sanctioned 20 Saudi officials but excluded MBS. This lack of decisive action has been criticized by human rights advocates as a failure to uphold international justice.

Rather than pursuing real accountability, the Khashoggi case became a political tool. U.S. administrations, both under Trump and Biden, used it for leverage against Riyadh. Even with a CIA assessment pointing to MBS’s direct involvement, the case was quietly dropped. Both presidents publicly promised justice, but neither followed through; choosing political expediency over principle.

This pattern highlights how Western governments often prioritise economic and strategic interests over human rights. The U.S., in particular, not only helped bury the case but also played a key role in rehabilitating MBS’s image as a “modernising reformer,” effectively allowing the crime to be swept under the rug.

Despite the continued push for justice, the recommendations have largely been ignored. The Saudi trial resulted in the conviction of lower-level operatives, but key figures including Saud al-Qahtani, a close adviser to MBS, and The Crown Prince himself faced no legal consequences.

A Continued Pattern:

Khashoggi’s assassination is not an isolated incident but part of a growing trend of journalist and transnational repression. Freedom House has documented 854 incidents of such repression from 38 governments in 91 countries between 2014 and 2022. Authoritarian regimes, including Saudi Arabia, China, and Russia, have increasingly targeted dissidents abroad through surveillance, harassment, and violence.

In the U.K., Saudi exiles have reported threats and intimidation, including death threats and harassment of family members back home. Despite these reports, British authorities have been criticized for failing to take adequate action, with some activists accusing the government of “turning a blind eye” due to diplomatic and economic ties with Saudi Arabia.

The Path Forward:

As of October 2025, the main perpetrators of Khashoggi’s murder remain unpunished. This acts as a reminder of a dangerous reality: without collective action, authoritarian regimes will continue to weaponize technology to silence dissent beyond their borders. DR4G believes that we must do more to uphold digital rights, protecting press freedom. Thus, implementing the UN’s recommendations, including independent investigations and targeted sanctions, is crucial to deter future violations and uphold the principles of human rights and freedom of expression.

2025-10-21
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait’s AI Partnership: Innovation or Entrenchment of Repression?

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are investing substantial resources into the development of artificial intelligence (AI). In a region where national goals focus on economic diversification, innovation, and digital transformation, AI is regarded as a key driver of long-term prosperity. GCC states have all eagerly launched national AI strategies and are now moving to strengthen regional collaboration on AI governance and innovation through strategic partnerships. The latest example of this is the newly forged agreement between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

On 8 July 2025, Saudi Arabia’s Artificial Intelligence Governance Association signed its first-ever international memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Kuwait’s Association of Artificial Intelligence of Things. The agreement seeks to advance AI standards, research, and responsible development in line with Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, Kuwait’s Vision 2035, and broader regional goals of exchanging expertise and promoting innovative policies. Yet, while the MoU is framed as a forward-looking partnership, it also raises human rights concerns.

Both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have troubling records of repression and restricting basic freedoms. Vague laws in both countries criminalize criticism of the government and impose harsh penalties on speech deemed subversive, including on online platforms that are heavily monitored and moderated. In such environments, AI technologies risk being used to identify, surveil, and target individuals in both physical and digital spaces. Digital rights advocates warn that these tools not only strengthen existing repressive practices but also enable new methods of infringing on privacy and freedom of expression, heightening risks for citizens.

These risks are amplified by the Gulf’s lack of meaningful AI regulation. Saudi Arabia is often commended for its “regulatory leadership” in AI, yet its framework primarily consists of non-binding guidelines that favor a business-friendly approach aimed at attracting investment. This regulatory model does nothing to protect privacy or limit surveillance, allowing possibilities for human rights abuses through AI technologies, without breaching any domestic laws.

Kuwait, on the other hand, remains in the early stages of its AI development. While it has made public pledges to integrate human rights principles into its AI strategy, these remain purely aspirational in the absence of any dedicated legal framework. By committing in the MoU to strengthen AI governance alongside Saudi Arabia, Kuwait is aligning with a regulatory model that lacks human rights protections. As it builds its own nascent AI framework, this alignment risks steering Kuwait toward a similar approach that prioritizes economic gains over fundamental freedoms, undermining its ethical commitments and potentially setting a precedent for similar governance models across the Gulf.

As GCC countries expand AI partnerships, innovation, and economic goals must be balanced with enforceable human rights and privacy protections embedded in binding regulatory frameworks. Without this, regional cooperation risks entrenching weak oversight and enabling the spread of repressive technologies in states already known for restricting freedoms. Only through such safeguards can AI development in the Gulf truly be ethical and responsible.

2025-10-08